Why was there No Famine Following the 1992 Southern African Drought? by Eldridge, Christopher
1 Introduction
The 1992 southern African drought was the region’s
worst drought in living memory. Many wells and
some perennial rivers dried. Well over a million
cattle died: 1.03 million in Zimbabwe alone, more
than 23 per cent of the national herd (Tobaiwa
1993). The drought affected around 86 million
people in the ten countries which then comprised
the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), of whom around 20 million people were
estimated to be at ‘serious risk’ (SADC July 1993).
Aggregate cereal production in the nine severely
affected countries (including South Africa) was 38
per cent of the previous 5-year mean, and only 22
per cent in Zimbabwe, often an exporting country.
Cereal imports into the ten SADC countries and
South Africa more than tripled during 1992/3, from
3.3 to 10.5 million tons (Clay et al. 1995).
Aggregate figures concealed even greater
reductions among the poor. Many smallholders
produced enough grain for only 2–3 months. Some
harvested little or nothing, and some lost all their
draught animals. In Zimbabwe’s communal lands,
maize production was only 9 per cent of the
previous seven years’ average, and maize yields
were only around a third of the national average
(Ministry of Agriculture, Zimbabwe 1996).
But there was no famine. Why not?
2 Changes in food sources
Most villagers in southern Africa are deficit food
producers. Even in ‘normal’ years, most
smallholders do not harvest enough to last them 12
months, for several reasons, including: insufficient
and/or poorly distributed rainfall,1 poor soils,
shortages of draught power, insufficient labour
and, in some areas, a lack of money for fertiliser.
Villagers already exploit a variety of food and income
sources in non-drought years to compensate for
production shortfalls. They therefore had few, if any
strategies in reserve for obtaining food to
compensate for production losses following the
1992 drought. Those activities sometimes described
as ‘coping strategies’ were also affected by the
drought. Per capita amounts of wild foods collected
were less than normal due to reduced rainfall and
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(or cash) obtained in exchange for work on richer
smallholders’ land dropped in parallel with the
reductions in harvests. Food gifts were reduced
compared with normal; the drought also affected
other villagers and urban relatives.
Drought relief and food-for-work programmes also
did not provide enough food to compensate for
harvest losses. Amounts received by the poorest
villagers (15–25 per cent of their staple food
requirements, on average) were generally
considerably less than the amounts distributed, for
several reasons. These included delayed
distributions (so one month’s ration had to last 6–8
weeks) due to logistical and organisational
constraints, and inadequate targeting (Tobaiwa
1993), sometimes compounded by wealthier
villagers and officials on distribution committees,
who reserved part of the ration for themselves.
The inability of ‘coping strategies’ and drought relief
programmes to compensate fully for production
losses meant that grain and maize-meal purchases
increased in virtually all households. Purchases
were the largest single source of staple food for most
people, especially among poor smallholders, who
had even smaller harvests in 1992 than wealthier
households, and no stocks from the 1991 harvest.
Purchases generally provided 2–3 times as much
staple food as drought relief programmes.
Food import statistics lend some support to this
finding. Emergency food aid requirements for nine
drought-affected countries in southern Africa in
1992/3 comprised around 14 per cent (1.45
million tons) of the total import requirement of
10.77 million tons. Omitting South Africa, the
percentage was around 28 per cent (1.45 out of
5.27 million tons) (Clay et al. 1995).
Purchases had drawbacks: prices rose greatly
during the drought, and supplies were erratic. In
addition, cash shortages meant that many poor
villagers could not buy as much grain or maize-
meal as they wanted, so they reduced their
consumption. Women in particular ate less,
attempting to ensure that their children had
enough. They sometimes ate only once a day and
occasionally went for 1–2 days without food,
especially during the hungry period – which was
much longer than usual – before the 1993 harvest.
3 Changes in household incomes
and income sources
Income from most sources fell during the drought.
Earnings from crop sales dropped. In Zambia, a
large proportion of the cash incomes of small-scale
farmers normally come from maize sales (Banda
1993). Many deficit producers sell part of their
grain harvest in normal years to finance ‘lumpy’
expenditure, such as school fees, or purchases of
assets. Several income sources depend on water
(beer-brewing, vegetable production, brick-
making), and these consequently produced smaller
earnings. Drought also reduced the amount of
harvest work available for poorer households on
larger farms.
Income from other income-generating activities
(e.g. the sale of rural crafts) fell too, due to reduced
demand; nearly all villagers increased their
purchases of staple food, and so had less to spend
on other purchases. For some richer households,
remittances increased slightly. For others they fell,
as they did for the few poor households who
normally received them.
Smallholders intensified a few income-generating
activities. In particular, livestock sales increased in
many households (see also Banda 1993). However,
as usually occurs during drought, livestock prices
dropped, due to one or more of three factors:
increased supply, decreased demand and – especially
for cattle – the poor condition of the animals. Cattle
prices dropped dramatically by mid-1992 in
Zimbabwe (earlier in parts of Zambia, due to an
outbreak of corridor disease): often by around
60–80 per cent. In some villages, the sale of a cow
could buy only 20 per cent as much maize-meal in
mid-1992 as in late 1991.
In a few villages the rural terms of trade dropped to
around 10 per cent of their pre-drought level.
Distress sales widened the economic gaps between
rich and poor villagers. When poor smallholders
sold cattle, the purchasers were richer people, who
bought cattle at unusually low prices. Goat prices
dropped in most districts during the drought –
typically by 20–40 per cent: less than the fall in
cattle prices, a reflection of their greater drought
tolerance. Poultry prices also generally fell. Wood
sales, mostly firewood, also intensified. In some
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villages, increased numbers of villagers attempting
to sell wood meant that deadwood supplies were
exhausted, and villagers cut down trees. A minority
of villagers sold household assets, and even fewer
sold productive assets, such as ploughs.
Attempts to finance increased staple food purchases
by increasing income had social consequences. In
some households an adult, generally a man, left
home for several weeks in search of work, but
usually with little success, as the macroeconomic
effects of the drought increased unemployment. A
number of children dropped out of school, either to
help their parents earn money, or to look after
livestock and younger children, thereby enabling
their parents to devote more time to income-
generating activities. A few poor parents arranged
marriages for their daughters earlier than usual, to
obtain brideprice as an additional source of cash or
livestock. Similarly, a few households sent children
away, to work elsewhere: girls as domestic servants,
and boys as cowherds, for example.
Only occasionally were new income-generating
activities, such as gold-panning in southeast
Zimbabwe (see Hicks 1993), initiated during the
drought. Most rural people, but particularly the
poor, live at the margins of economic life, and
already exploit every possible way of earning
money. Where earnings from a particular source
increased, they were generally insufficient to
outweigh the reduction in earnings from other
sources. The assumption that villagers would
increase their incomes during drought by resorting
to ‘coping strategies’ was generally not supported
in 1992. Overall earnings tended to reduce rather
than increase, especially in poor households.
4 Changes in household
expenditure
Increases in staple purchases were financed
substantially by expenditure reductions, since rural
incomes fell (see above) for many households, or, at
least, did not increase sufficiently to cover increased
purchases. These expenditure reductions tended to
be greater among poor households, who
experienced larger income reductions than better-off
families. Expenditure reductions were greatest for
clothes and household items, but a number of poor
households also spent less on essential services.
Reductions in expenditure on education were greater
than they superficially appeared, as the total cost of
education comprises several different charges. These
include national fees and several local charges, for
example, levies for new buildings or for maintenance
of existing buildings. In addition, books and
sometimes uniforms had to be bought. Expenditure
cuts on education (which comprised 10–20 per cent
of total expenditure for many poor households before
the drought) led to some school drop-outs. There
were slightly more drop-outs among girls than boys,
but the gender difference widened after the drought,
when fewer girls returned to school than boys, due to
pregnancy or early marriage.
Some poor smallholders also reduced their
expenditure on farm inputs, mainly on fertiliser,
though a few also cut expenditure on hybrid maize
seed. Cuts in fertiliser purchases often interacted
with draught power losses to reduce post-drought
harvests below their expected levels.
A number of poor households also reduced
expenditure on health, mostly by reducing the
purchase of medical supplies, though reduced
expenditure on drugs was partly due to supply
shortages, which increased during the drought.
They also spent less on transport, though the
savings this produced were small.
5 Changes in livestock numbers
Most poor smallholders owning cattle in 1991 lost
substantial proportions of their herds during the
1992 drought as a result of distress sales, slaughter
for food, and deaths due to disease and shortages
of water and grazing. The poorest households lost
most or all of their cattle. The period of peak
mortality was May–July, though in parts of Zambia
it was earlier, due to corridor disease. Cattle
ownership in Malawi among smallholders is largely
confined to the south, so aggregate cattle losses
during the 1992 drought were much smaller than
in Zambia and Zimbabwe. In the mid-1990s only
37 per cent of rural Malawian households owned
any livestock at all (Ministry of Economic Planning
and Development, Malawi 1996). Proportional
losses in 1992 were nevertheless substantial.
Villagers attempted to reduce cattle mortality in
two main ways: they took their cattle considerably
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further than usual in search of water and grazing,
and they collected leaves and pods – sometimes
cutting branches from trees – for use as fodder.
When these attempts began to fail, in mid-1992,
smallholders tried to sell their cattle. The poor
condition of the animals, coupled with increasing
supply and decreasing demand, reduced cattle
prices dramatically by mid-1992, as noted above.
Relatively little external assistance was provided to
keep livestock alive.
The impact of cattle losses was greater on the poor
than on the rich. Most richer households remained
with some draught animals after the drought.
However, many poor smallholders who had only a
few draught animals in 1991 lost all of them during
the drought. Consequently, they ploughed less land
or they ploughed later – they waited to hire or
borrow draught animals from wealthier farmers.
The drought also affected other animals. Mortality
rates among goats were higher than normal,
though generally lower than for cattle. Substantial
numbers of poultry died during the drought due to
outbreaks of Newcastle’s disease. Household water
shortages were also a factor.
6 Changes in water supplies and
water sources
Many more water sources than usual ran dry
during 1992: most shallow wells, many deep wells
and boreholes – 44 per cent and 20 per cent,
respectively, in Zimbabwe’s communal areas by
March 1992 (Taylor and Mudege 1992) – and some
dams and rivers. Water yields dropped much more
than usual in most of the wells and boreholes
which did not run dry. Water shortages were
exacerbated by pumps breaking down as a result of
increased use, and by delays in repairing them. The
frequency of breakdowns was increased by
inadequate prior maintenance in many villages.
Villagers responded to reduced water availability in
various ways. Women, sometimes helped by their
children, fetched water from more distant water
points. Households dug shallow wells in dry river
beds, where these were accessible (such wells are
dug in many villages even during normal years, but
their number increased during the drought).
Households rationed their own water use: villages
established community rules restricting water use –
for example, the sizes of water containers, and the
times at which water could be collected were
restricted in some villages.
Problems resulting from reduced household water
supplies included: increased time spent collecting
water – often several hours a day and taking 3–4
times as long as usual (Tobaiwa 1993) – with
concomitant opportunity costs; increased
exhaustion; increased incidence of diarrhoea (to
which children are especially vulnerable); and
greater concentrations of livestock (and, in some
areas, game) around water points, sometimes
resulting in contamination of water supplies.
These problems compounded those caused by
overall reductions in groundwater supplies: increased
livestock mortality, leading to reductions in area
planted, smaller harvests, and reduced earnings from
other water-dependent income sources.
7 Post-drought harvests
Distributions of free seed and, in some cases,
fertiliser – mostly by the government (in Zimbabwe
and Malawi) but also by NGOs (in Zambia and, to
a lesser extent, in Zimbabwe and Malawi) –
contributed to the larger than average aggregate
cereal harvest which followed the 1992 drought. In
Malawi, it was estimated (Henry 1996) that the
distribution of free seed (fertiliser was not
distributed in 1992 in Malawi) was responsible for
around 15 per cent of the record harvest in 1993 of
over 2 million tons.
In Zimbabwe, 56 per cent of farmers surveyed by
SADC/ICRISAT obtained their maize seed from the
government. However, disaggregation revealed the
substantial efforts of drought-prone smallholders.
Despite the severity of the drought, most of the
millet and sorghum seed they planted – in lower
rainfall areas than maize – had been retained from
the previous harvest, contrary to the assumption
that household seed stocks had been widely
consumed (Friis-Hansen and Rohrbach 1993).
Many smallholders received free seed after they had
already bought hybrid maize seed and a substantial
number received it after they had already planted.
Planting late generally resulted in lower yields, a
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finding confirmed by the SADC/ICRISAT survey. In
Zimbabwe, fertiliser deliveries were greatly delayed
in some areas, and so in those areas the fertiliser
was not used during the 1992/93 season (Tobaiwa
1993).
Aggregate cereal production figures concealed
substantial differences between households. Even
though the rains that followed the drought were
greater than average, many poorer farmers planted
smaller areas and thus had smaller post-drought
harvests than expected. Factors contributing to this
varied, but included the following:
l food shortages forced them to work away from
their own land for longer than usual during the
agricultural season, on richer farmers’ land, in
income-generating activities or on food-for-
work projects;
l cattle sales and deaths left poorer cattle owners
(those with only a few cattle) with no draught
animals after the drought: in the short term they
had to cultivate by hand (some pulled ploughs
themselves). It took some many years to restock,
and some had not restocked 9 years later;
l others waited to hire draught animals from
richer farmers; but planting later also
contributed to reduced harvests;
l for very poor households, a shortage of cash to
buy seed and/or fertiliser was also a factor.
The need for poor farmers to work away from their
own land for even longer than usual towards the end
of 1992, to meet short-term requirements for food
and money, was one of the transmission mechanisms
by which the adverse impacts on rural livelihoods of
some smallholder responses to the drought
continued after the rains returned. This contributed
to a lower than expected post-drought harvest, which
further tightened the vicious circle in which poor
smallholders are trapped. It meant that, once again,
in late 1993, they were forced to work off their land
for longer than they otherwise would have.
Another such transmission mechanism, in the case
of Malawi, was the collapse of the agricultural
credit scheme, caused partly by the inability of
most poor farmers to repay farm input loans after
the drought, due to the large reductions in their
1992 harvests. The collapse of the scheme reduced
access by the poorest farmers to seed and –
particularly – fertiliser and thus again contributed
to lower than expected post-drought harvests.
Generally, richer smallholders did not reduce the
total area they planted. They usually had sufficient
draught animals after the drought for ploughing,
though they too experienced substantial losses.
Moreover, they had sufficient labour – either their
own, or the labour of poorer farmers – and
sufficient earnings from various income sources to
maintain pre-drought hectarages.
8 Conclusion
Most of the effective responses to the 1992 drought
consisted of activities undertaken by those most
affected by it, particularly women (see also SADC,
September 1993). Drought-affected villagers
obtained 70–80 per cent of their staple food from
non-aid sources – mostly through purchases,
which increased substantially. Purchases provided
2–3 times as much staple food as drought relief
programmes in many poor households.
The major role of purchases during the 1992 drought
should not be surprising. Johnson (1996) and
Corbett (1994) describe their importance for poor
households in a normal year in Malawi and
Zimbabwe respectively. They are especially important
in female-headed smallholder households (which
comprise over 30 per cent of rural households in
Malawi), where farm labour shortages are even more
of a constraint than in male-headed households. In
Zambia, over 40 per cent of food consumed by
female-headed households in a normal (early 1990s)
year was bought (World Bank 1993).
During the 1992 drought, harvests and ‘coping
strategies’ produced even less staple food than
normal. Various factors imposed a ceiling on the
contributions of relief food distributions, which
provided only 15–25 per cent of a household’s
cereal requirements. Given these two decreases,
and the absence of famine, it was logical that
purchases should have increased (as this study
found). Consumption reductions offset the size of
the increase in purchases to a certain extent, but
nevertheless purchases generally rose.
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Table 1: The 1992 drought in southern Africa: a summary of its impacts, consequences and
lessons for policy
The importance of household responses to food crises
l Those most affected by a crisis, especially poor people, often contribute a large and underestimated
proportion of the overall responses to it.
l Famine following the 1992 southern Africa drought was averted largely by the activities of those it
affected most, particularly women.
l Some activities helped poor households survive the 1992 drought in the short term at the cost of
compromising their medium-term livelihood security.
Cereal purchases and their consequences
l Purchases comprised the largest source of cereals for most villagers in 1992; for many households
purchases provided 2–3 times as much staple food as relief programmes.
l Financing these purchases had adverse longer-term consequences, mainly due to severe
deteriorations in the rural terms of trade.
l Poverty forced the poorest drought-affected households to variously cut expenditure on education
and agricultural inputs (as well as on other less essential items), work off their own land for longer
than usual; and, in some cases, sell assets.
Poverty, drought and inequity
l Poverty amplified the harmful effects of the 1992 drought on livelihoods. Correspondingly, the
drought deepened the poverty of the most under-resourced households.
l Markets for both food and rural commodities worked against most households. Earnings from
many income sources (particularly water-dependent sources) decreased, especially among poor
smallholders.
l Economic inequities were worsened by the drought. These inequities also reduced access by some
of the poorest people to relief and rehabilitation programmes.
The relatively small role of relief and rehabilitation programmes
l Food aid received by the poorest drought-affected people accounted for just 15–25 per cent of a
household’s cereal requirements. In addition to relatively small receipts, villagers also complained
of late or infrequent deliveries, and poor targeting: richer villagers sometimes received more
drought relief food than poor villagers.
l Villagers received little external support for their livestock, very little help to reduce non-survival
expenditure, and no assistance to maintain their purchasing power.
l The 1992 southern Africa relief and rehabilitation programme was a success, in conventional terms.
But it illustrated a double deficiency of most food aid programmes of the last two decades: a failure
to adequately involve those people most affected by food crises in these programmes, and a failure
to address the adverse impacts of changes in market processes on household livelihood security
during those crises.
Policy implications for food crises
l Interventions before and during food crises should complement and support the activities of the
poorest and most vulnerable households.
l The people most affected by crises should participate in the planning and implementation of
emergency aid programmes, to maximise their effectiveness.
l Particular emphasis should be placed on interventions that minimise reductions in the purchasing























































Financing these increased purchases often involved
compromising longer-term livelihood security to
an even greater extent than usual, especially for
poor rural households. Most villagers intensified a
few non-water dependent income-generating
activities, some sold their last remaining draught
animals, and some cut expenditure on education
and agricultural inputs. To obtain staple food
during the planting season, they worked off their
own land for longer than usual, contributing to a
smaller than expected harvest.
Although purchases increased, and were the largest
source of staple food for most poor smallholders,
villagers received almost no assistance to maintain
their pre-drought purchasing power. There were
virtually no attempts to stabilise staple food prices
at pre-drought levels. Nor were any significant
efforts made to prevent livestock prices falling.
These – often large – decreases, coupled with
substantial increases in the price of staple food,
greatly worsened the rural terms of trade. Villagers’
attempts to reduce livestock mortality dwarfed the
little external assistance that was provided.
Similarly, the largest proportion of responses to
water problems comprised activities by villagers.
ODA’s emergency water programmes in Lesotho,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe made little immediate
difference to the majority of drought-affected
people during the drought (Clay et al. 1995). By
mid-November 1992 only 11 per cent of the target
of 4,086 handpumps had been installed at water
points in Zimbabwe’s rural areas (UNDP 1992).
However, the emergency programme improved
water supplies in a number of villages over the
longer term – this figure doubled to 24 per cent by
April 1993 (Tobaiwa 1993).
In proportionate terms, the distribution of seed in
late 1992, largely carried out by governments, was
the most successful type of external assistance
(though this was post-drought rehabilitation and
not a drought relief programme). However, for
drought-tolerant cereal crops (millet and
sorghum), the largest percentage of seed varieties
planted came from smallholders themselves.
The limitations of the various components of the
1992 relief and rehabilitation programme are
common to most emergency operations, which
appear to have a receipt ceiling. Most seem unable to
ensure that the poorest smallholders receive much
more than 15–25 per cent of the per capita monthly
cereal requirement, for example. This constraint
merely serves to highlight the relative effectiveness of
the unquantified responses to the 1992 drought by
the 20 million people estimated to be at ‘serious risk’
of starvation in southern Africa (SADC, July 1993).
Future relief programmes should therefore be used
as precision instruments, rather than as scatterguns.
They should complement these responses and
support them, where they do not damage
sustainable livelihoods, especially since
smallholders’ responses to the 1992 drought
probably compromised their ability to respond
equally effectively to future food crises. In particular,
relief interventions should aim to minimise the large
decreases in poor people’s purchasing power, which
normally occur during food crises. This is important
for two reasons. First, to maximise effectiveness,
support should be focused on a major activity likely
to be undertaken by drought-affected people
themselves: buying staple food. Second, maintaining
the pre-crisis purchasing power of the poorest
households will help protect livelihoods, which are
compromised by their attempts to finance increased
food purchases.
Interventions which minimise reductions in the
purchasing power of the poorest households
include subsidies, fee waivers, livestock price
stabilisation, and cash-for-work projects (Eldridge
2002). Tight and accurate targeting, perhaps
undertaken using vouchers, is essential if these
measures are to be effective.
Within the limits of conventional emergency
programmes, the 1992 relief and rehabilitation
programme, one of the largest and best coordinated
ever undertaken (Clay et al. 1995), was a success.
Nevertheless, famine in southern Africa in 1992/3
was averted largely by the activities of those most
severely affected by the most calamitous drought in
half a century, though the context was important:
there was no conflict in the worst affected countries,
governments generally reacted responsibly, if
belatedly, and donors were unusually responsive.
This account of the 1992 drought from the
perspective of those most affected by it began with
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the question: why was there no famine in southern
Africa in 1992? It ends end with two more
questions: why, despite the passage of over 20 years
since Sen’s entitlement approach (Sen 1981)
emphasised failures of demand in food crises (see
also Devereux 1993; Devereux and Maxwell 2001)
have few, if any, subsequent relief programmes
addressed demand issues? And why, given the
many roles that drought-affected people play in
responding to drought, are they not more involved
in the planning and implementation of drought
relief and rehabilitation programmes?
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Notes
* This paper is based on the findings of a participatory
study, involving 936 households in 72 villages in
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, of how smallholders
responded to the 1992 drought. It was conducted
while the author was head of Save the Children-UK’s
Regional Office for Southern Africa.
1. The 1991/2 drought in Zambia was an
agricultural rather than a meteorological drought:
total rainfall was not significantly below recent
norms, but its early cessation inhibited the
maturation of maize (World Bank 1993).
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